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As part of a wave of legislation intended to toughen federal
criminal laws,1 Congress in 1984 passed the Sentencing Reform
Act.2 Responding to perceived discrepancies in federal sentencing,3
the Act created the Federal Sentencing Commission to promulgate
sentencing guidelines which would structure the imposition of
sentences on convicted criminal defendants.4 Application of the
Guidelines to a specific case produces a sentencing range within
which the judge is normally expected to sentence the criminal of-
fender. Choice of a sentence from within the range is not
mandatory, however. The judge may depart from, the guideline
range if the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described."'5
Some defendants have requested a downward departure from
the Guidelines' sentencing range based on their successful rehabili-
tation or rehabilitative efforts in the period following arrest and
preceding sentencing. Other defendants have based their request
for departure on the grounds that there is a good chance they will
be rehabilitated. Although courts are split as to whether such post-
offense rehabilitation constitutes a valid ground for departure
t B.A. 1989, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1993, The University of Chicago.
I Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837 (1987),
codified at 18 USC §§ 3551-3742 and 28 USC §§ 991-998 (1988).
2 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 1976 (1984).
3 Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 365 (1989) ("Serious disparities in sentences
[] were common.").
4 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess
63 (1983), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3182, 3246.
1 United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual §
5K2.0 (West, 1992) ("Guidelines Manual' (quoting 18 USC § 3553(b) (1988)). Some courts
have concluded that in the absence of this departure privilege, the Guidelines would fail to
comply with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment. See, for example,
United States v Thomas, 884 F2d 540, 542-43 (10th Cir 1989).
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under the Guidelines, a substantial majority has concluded that a
judge may not depart from the guideline range in this instance.
This Comment argues that evidence of a defendant's affirmative
efforts at drug rehabilitation prior to sentencing can be a valid
grounds for departure from the Guidelines.
Section I addresses the creation and structure of the Guide-
lines. Section II delineates and critiques the primary arguments
courts have made in finding such departures precluded. Section III
scrutinizes the decisions that have allowed for the possibility of de-
parture and illustrates the weaknesses in some of their arguments.
Finally, Section IV proposes that the defendant's post-offense drug
rehabilitation can be a legitimate ground for departure, when the
defendant has exhibited genuine affirmative efforts at
rehabilitation.
I. THE GUIDELINES' BACKGROUND
A. The Shift to Determinate Sentencing: The Sentencing Reform
Act
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, criminologists and empirical
researchers began to seriously examine the indeterminate sentenc-
ing system. What they found was widespread and unjustifiable dis-
parity in sentences and a rate of recidivism that reflected the fail-
ure of prison reform programs." By the mid-1980s a consensus had
developed that sentencing guidelines of some form were needed,
and Congress responded by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. The Act created the Sentencing Commission, and gave it au-
thority to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines.'
Although the Act outlined the purposes of sentencing,9 limited
the types of punishment courts could impose," and provided for
appellate review of sentencing decisions," the Act's directives to
the Commission were largely advisory. For instance, the Commis-
sion was largely not required to include any particular factor in the
6 Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J Crim L and Criminol 883, 896 nn 76-77 (listing studies).
' This growing consensus was reflected at the state level. By the mid-1980s, thirteen
states had adopted a guideline system. Sandra Shane-DuBow, Alice P. Brown, and Erik
Olsen, Sentencing Reform in the United States: History, Content and Effect 290-92 (GPO,
1985).
' See 28 USC §§ 991, 992.
9 18 USC § 3553(a)(2).
"o 18 USC § 3551.
-' 18 USC § 3742.
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Guidelines, but was merely instructed to consider if a suggested
list of factors should have any relevance to a sentencing decision.
12
B. The Commission's Product: Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Commission engaged in exhaustive hearings and produced
several drafts of the Guidelines before agreeing on the version that
took effect on November 1, 1987.'3 The Guidelines establish a two-
dimensional matrix for plotting the defendant's sentence. 4 The
vertical axis represents the severity of the defendant's offense ("of-
fense level"), while the horizontal axis plots the defendant's crimi-
nal history ("criminal history category"). Correlating the defend-
ant's position on each axis produces a guideline sentencing range.
The judge is normally expected to select a sentence from within
that range.' 5 Section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines, however, provides
that a judge may depart from the specified sentencing range in cer-
tain instances:
[T]he sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the
range established by the applicable guideline, if the court
finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described." Circumstances that may warrant departure
from the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their
very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in ad-
vance. The controlling decision as to whether and to what ex-
tent departure is warranted can only be made by the courts
16
The statute further specifies that in determining whether the
Commission adequately considered a circumstance, the court may
only consider the "sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and of-
2 28 USC § 994(d) (directing the Commission to consider the relevance of certain of-
fender characteristics). Note, however, that this same section directs the Commission to as-
sure that the Guidelines are neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeco-
nomic status of offenders.
"3 Guidelines Manual ch 1 at 1 (cited in note 5). References to chapter 1 of the Guide-
lines Manual are to the official introduction. All other references use section numbers.
" Id at § 5A.
'5 Id, ch 1 at 1.
18 Id at § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 USC § 3553(b) (1988)). Other provisions of the Guidelines
also allow for departure. See note 113. None of these other departure privileges are relevant
to this Comment.
1992]
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ficial commentary of the Sentencing Commission."1 The legiti-
macy of a departure from the guideline range thus amounts to a
survey of these sources for evidence of consideration by the Com-
mission. Absent such consideration, any circumstance that "should
result" in a different sentence is a legitimate ground for
departure.'
Whether the Commission has adequately considered a given
circumstance is not always self-evident, however. One context in
which courts have disagreed over whether such consideration has
taken place is the legitimacy of downward departure based on the
defendant's rehabilitative efforts prior to sentencing. 19
17 18 USC § 3553(b), as amended by the Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-182, §
3, 101 Stat 1266 (1988). Interestingly, this requirement was added to § 3553(b) at the spe-
cific behest of Commission members who foresaw that without such a limitation their per-
sonal files might be discoverable in a dispute over the legitimacy of a departure. See 133
Cong Rec H10017 (daily ed, Nov 16, 1987).
18 See United States v Savage, 888 F2d 528, 529 (7th Cir 1989) ("[I]t takes an express
direction to foreclose a particular consideration as a basis of departure."). This is not to
imply that the Guidelines mandate a textualist interpretation. Rather, whatever theory of
interpretation is employed in reading the Guidelines, the basis for finding the Commission's
consideration must derive from a specific provision of the Guidelines, rather than a general
impression of what the Commission must have thought about. This canon is reinforced by §
1B1.4, which allows the court to "consider, without limitation, any information concerning
the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by
law," in determining whether a departure from the Guidelines is warranted. Guidelines
Manual § 1B1.4 (cited in note 5).
19 Drug rehabilitation is not specifically mentioned as a legitimate ground for depar-
ture, nor is it specifically listed as a factor on which a departure cannot be based. The sole
inquiry therefore is whether one of the Guidelines' provisions that does not specifically men-
tion drug rehabilitation constitutes adequate consideration of that circumstance.
Courts holding that a defendant's drug rehabilitation is not grounds for departure in
most circumstances include United States v Harrington, 947 F2d 956, 962 (DC Cir 1991)
("Harrington II'); United States v Sklar, 920 F2d 107, 116 (1st Cir 1990), cert denied, 111
S Ct 2274 (1991); United States v Pharr, 916 F2d 129, 130 (3d Cir 1990); United States v
Van Dyke, 895 F2d 984, 987 (4th Cir 1990); United States v Martin, 938 F2d 162, 164 (9th
Cir 1991); United States v Williams, 948 F2d 706, 710-11 (11th Cir 1991). In addition, the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have found departure precluded on account of the defendant's
non-drug related rehabilitative efforts. United States v Bruder, 945 F2d 167, 173 (7th Cir
1991) (en banc); United States v Desormeaux, 952 F2d 182, 185-86 (8th Cir 1991) (attaining
GED does not form basis for departure). While Sklar, Harrington II and Williams left open
the possibility of a departure in certain unusual circumstances, these cases stressed the rar-
ity of such circumstances and denied departure in the cases there under review.
Courts that have accepted post-offense drug rehabilitation as a legitimate basis for de-
parture include United States v Maddalena, 893 F2d 815, 818 (6th Cir 1989); United States
v Maier, 777 F Supp 293, 296 (S D NY 1991); United States v Davis, 763 F Supp 645, 652
(D DC 1991); United States v Floyd, 738 F Supp 1256 (D Minn 1990); United States v
Rodriguez, 724 F Supp 1118, 1119 (S D NY 1989).
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II. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF CASES NOT ALLOWING DEPARTURE
FOR DRUG REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS
The courts that have refused to allow departure based on the
defendant's post-offense drug rehabilitation have advanced four
primary arguments: 1) the Commission adequately considered drug
rehabilitation in the Guidelines' provision allowing a reduction in
sentence based on the defendant's acceptance of responsibility;2 0 2)
the Commission adequately considered drug rehabilitation in the
Guidelines' proscription against departing downward based on the
defendant's drug dependency at the time of the crime;21 3) al-
lowing a sentence reduction for drug rehabilitation is contrary to
the Act's stated objective that imprisonment not be used as a
means of promoting rehabilitation; and 4) allowing drug addicts a
potential reduction is unfair to defendants who are not addicted to
drugs. Underlying these arguments may be a more general concern
that allowing such a departure amounts to a subversion of the
Guidelines. This section addresses the validity of each of these ar-
guments, concluding that each is significantly flawed and that drug
rehabilitation is a legitimate ground for departure from the sen-
tencing range.
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
The strongest argument against allowing departure is that
drug rehabilitation has been afforded adequate consideration by
the Commission under § 3E1.1, the acceptance of responsibility ad-
justment. Specifically, § 3E1.1 allows the judge to award the de-
fendant a two point reduction in offense level when the defendant
has "clearly demonstrate[d] a recognition and affirmative accept-
ance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. 2 2 The sec-
tion's commentary provides the court with a number of factors to
consider in reaching this determination:
2' Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (cited in note 5).
21 Id at § 5H1.4.
21 Id at § 3E1.1(a). At least one criminologist has assailed § 3E1.1 as a "guilty plea
discount" that illegitimately provides an official reward for a guilty plea. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 FRD
459, 471-72 (1987). See also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1, 28-29 (1988) (acknowledg-
ing that the "Guidelines' solution to this problem [of defendants who plead guilty receiving
a 30-40% lower sentence than those who plead not guilty and are subsequently convicted] is
to provide a two-level discount... for what the Guidelines call 'acceptance of responsibil-
ity.' "). Judge Breyer was an instrumental member of the Commission that drafted the
Guidelines.
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(a) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal con-
duct or associations;
(b) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of
guilt;
(c) voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of involve-
ment in the offense and related conduct;
(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commis-
sion of the offense;
(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the
fruits and instrumentalities of the offense;
(f) voluntary resignation from the office or position held dur-
ing the commission of the offense; and
(g) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting
the acceptance of responsibility. 3
The commentary points out that this list of factors is not meant to
be exhaustive. A defendant that has taken "some equivalent ac-
tion" may also be considered for a reduction under this section. 4
Three arguments based on § 3E1.1 have emerged to support
the notion that departure for drug rehabilitation is illegitimate
under the Guidelines. In United States v Van Dyke, the court
characterized the defendant's drug rehabilitation as equivalent
conduct to the actions listed in the commentary to § 3E1.1.25 Thus,
the court concluded a departure based upon drug rehabilitation
was not acceptable. The courts in United States v Sklar,26 and
United States v Harrington (Harrington 11)27 adopted a slightly
different approach. Rather than finding an actual part of the
Guidelines' text that evinced the Commission's consideration of
drug rehabilitation, they merely concluded that the Commission
"must have considered" drug rehabilitation in formulating
§ 3E1.1.2 Finally, drug rehabilitation may have been considered in
§ 3E1.1 since the application notes instruct that "voluntary termi-
nation or withdrawal from criminal conduct" is relevant to assess-
ing the defendant's acceptance of responsibility.
23 Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (application notes) (cited in note 5). Note that unlike the
commonly invoked "substantial assistance" departure provided for in § 5K1.1, the down-
ward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility need not be requested by the government's
motion.
" Id at § 3E1.1 (background commentary).
2. 895 F2d 984, 987 (4th Cir 1990).
21 920 F2d 107 (1st Cir 1990).
27 947 F2d 956 (DC Cir 1991).
28 Sklar, 920 F2d at 119; Harrington II, 947 F2d at 972.
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1. Drug rehabilitation as equivalent to the conduct listed in
the commentary to § 3E1.1.
In Van Dyke, the Fourth Circuit painted in broad strokes in
the course of reversing the district court's downward departure
from the sentencing range.29 The defendant was convicted on
charges of possession of a controlled substance. While held in pre-
trial detention, the defendant participated in a drug treatment
program and counselled fellow inmates about drug abuse. The dis-
trict court reduced the offense level for acceptance of responsibility
under § 3E1.1, and then departed downward from the sentencing
range stating that he was "satisfied that the defendant is trying to
rehabilitate himself, and therefore I don't think a longer sentence
is required." 30
The Court of Appeals reversed, lumping the defendant's ef-
forts at rehabilitation into the broader category of post-offense
conduct, which the court felt could not be considered a reason for
downward departure. s Specifically, the court argued that drug re-
habilitation is conduct "equivalent" to the factors listed in the
commentary to § 3E1.l. To make this comparison, the court de-
scribed the factors listed in § 3E1.1's commentary, such as volunta-
rily making restitution or helping recover the fruits of the crime, as
examples of "rehabilitative" conduct.32
The approach taken by the appeals court in Van Dyke has not
been universally accepted. In fact, another panel of the same cir-
cuit that decided Van Dyke concluded that rehabilitation had
nothing to do with the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. In
United States v Braxton,33 the Fourth Circuit reversed a district
court's holding that rehabilitation was a necessary element of an
" The Van Dyke opinion was written by Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr. of the Fourth
Circuit, who is currently Chairman of the Sentencing Commission.
SO Van Dyke, 895 F2d at 986. The sentencing judge, confused over the applicable guide-
line range, sentenced the defendant to a period within the lower of two potentially applica-
ble ranges, and announced that if his choice of range turned out to be incorrect, the sen-
tence should be viewed as a downward departure. The appellate court found the longer of
the two ranges applicable, and thus treated the imposed sentence as a downward departure.
11 Id at 987. The court found departures based on "post offense conduct" foreclosed
due to its having received adequate consideration in § 3E1.l's provision for "acceptance of
responsibility," § 3C1.1's adjustment for "obstruction of justice," and § 5K1.1's allowance
for "substantial assistance." Id at 986-87, 987 n 1. Such a broad contention is at odds with
both the language of the Guidelines and a good deal of case law. See, for example, United
States v Sanchez, 893 F2d 679, 681 (5th Cir 1990) (allowing an upward departure based on
the defendant's "continued unlawful behavior" while on release after his arrest).
, Van Dyke, 895 F2d at 987.
3. 903 F2d 292 (4th Cir 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S Ct 1854 (1991).
1992]
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acceptance of responsibility. The lower court denied this reduction
to the defendant on the grounds that he was incapable of being
rehabilitated. In reversing the sentencing court, the court empha-
sized that the word "rehabilitation" is not used in § 3E1.1, its ap-
plication notes, or commentary, has not been considered in any
case construing § 3E1.1 (apparently the court overlooked Van
Dyke), and concluded that the district court had "misperceived the
purpose of the guideline [§ 3E1.1] by interjecting into the calculus
a need for rehabilitation. 3 4
One could technically reconcile Braxton and Van Dyke on the
grounds that Braxton only holds that rehabilitation is not a sine
qua non of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.3 5 There is
no doubt, however, that the breadth of the case's language casts
doubt on the continued vitality of the Fourth Circuit's earlier pro-
nouncement in Van Dyke.
Braxton is not alone; even appellate courts holding that a sen-
tencing court may not depart downward on the basis of the de-
fendant's drug rehabilitation have found rehabilitation irrelevant
to assessing the defendant's acceptance of responsibility under §
3E1.1. In United States v Pharr, the Third Circuit found drug re-
habilitation inconsistent with the underlying nature of the factors
included in § 3E1.1.3 Pharr, a heroin addict, had entered and suc-
cessfully completed an inpatient drug rehabilitation program prior
to his sentencing.37 Finding that the Guidelines did not give ade-
quate consideration to the defendant's "conscientious efforts" to
overcome his heroin addiction or the effects of incarceration on
those efforts, the district court adjusted Pharr's sentence to reflect
the acceptance of responsibility, and then departed downward.38
The appellate court reversed the departure, and held that
Pharr was not eligible for the acceptance of responsibility adjust-
ment either. In reaching the latter conclusion, the court reasoned
that the list of factors in the commentary to § 3E1.1 "relate to
actions by the defendant either accepting responsibility for the of-
fense for which he is being sentenced or mitigating the effects of
his criminal activity."3 " In contrast, Pharr's actions in entering a
drug rehabilitation program were only attempts at "self-improve-
34 Id at 296.
"' For such a reconciliation, see Sklar, 920 F2d at 116 n 10.
36 916 F2d at 129.
17 Id at 130.
38 Id.
"' Id at 131.
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ment"-"not the type of conduct contemplated by the acceptance
of responsibility provisions of the guidelines. "40
While the court's attempt to create a simple dichotomy be-
tween accepting responsibility and self-improvement rings a bit
false, there is an underlying truth to their observations: drug reha-
bilitation does not seem to match the purposes of § 3EL.1. Each of
the factors requires either cooperation with the authorities in
processing the case through the criminal justice system4' or in rem-
edying the harm caused by the crime.42 Drug rehabilitation does
not fit comfortably within either of these categories; its connection
to the notion of acceptance of responsibility for the crime commit-
ted-be it drug-related or not-is much more attenuated than any
of the factors listed in § 3E1.1. This insight is even more powerful
if, as some commentators have argued, § 3E1.1 is actually a "guilty
plea discount" which operates to provide an official reward for a
guilty plea.43 Given this objective, it is difficult to see what the de-
fendant's drug rehabilitation could do to further this goal.
2. What the Commission "must have considered."
Several courts have rejected the notion that drug rehabilita-
tion can be grounds for departure by relying on a speculative as-
sessment of what the Commission must have considered in draft-
ing § 3E1.1. This method of reading the Guidelines is improper.
In United States v Sklar,44 a panel of the First Circuit re-
versed the district court's downward departure on the basis of the
40 Id. See also Harrington II, 947 F2d at 970-71 (Silberman dissenting). In Pharr, the
court distinguished Van Dyke on the grounds that "Van Dyke's drug rehabilitation efforts
were directly related to the crime for which he was being sentenced" (possession of heroin
with intent to distribute), suggesting that drug rehabilitation could be an acceptance of re-
sponsibility only when the defendant's crime is "drug related." Pharr, 916 F2d at 132.
The court did not specify which crimes qualify as "drug related," but it seems to re-
quire more than a causal connection between drug addiction and commission of the crime
(in Pharr, the defendant acknowledged that he was an addict and that this addiction caused
him to sell stolen U.S. Treasury checks, but his crime was not considered "drug related").
However, a narrow interpretation of which crimes are "drug related"-only those involving
the use or distribution of drugs-may lead to arbitrary results. Compare with Pharr a de-
fendant who has smuggled drugs for years because she reaps a generous profit from the
trade and enjoys the danger. A month prior to her arrest for distribution, she starts to
regularly use her product. After arrest, she quickly breaks the addiction and, by Pharr's
logic, is thus eligible for a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility.
" See Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (application note 1, parts (a), (c), (d), and (f)) (cited
in note 5).
42 Id at § 3E1.1 (application note 1, parts (b) and (e)).
's See note 22.
920 F2d 107 (1st Cir 1990).
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defendant's attempts at rehabilitation in the year following his ar-
rest and preceding his sentence. The court concluded that the
Commission "seems to have factored presentence rehabilitation
into a two level reduction in the offense level for acceptance of re-
sponsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E.1. ' 4 5 The court provided no rea-
sons why drug rehabilitation falls under § 3E1.1. Rather, the court
apparently based this finding on its impression of what the Com-
mission must have considered:
To assume that there was a qualitative failure-an oversight
in not featuring presentence rehabilitation more prominently
in the guidelines-beggars credulity. Cf. United States v.
Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990) (defendant's preg-
nancy held not to be a factor warranting downward departure;
Sentencing Commission must have been fully aware that some
convicted female felons are pregnant at the time of
sentencing") .46
The legitimacy of this analysis, however, is far from clear. The
Sklar opinion, as did the Pozzy opinion it relied upon, finds con-
sideration merely by speculating as to what the Commission must
have considered rather than by finding consideration in the text of
the Guidelines itself. Such reasoning flouts the very structure of
the departure privilege by creating a presumption against depar-
ture when the Commission has not addressed a particular circum-
stance.47 The Act, however, makes clear that the adequate consid-
eration test is not a license to embark on a journey into the minds
of the Commissioners. 48 Rather than relying on speculation about
the Commission's thought processes, consideration of a circum-
stance must be grounded in a portion of the Guidelines' text. If
such a basis cannot be found in the text, then the circumstance has
to be deemed to have not been considered by the Commission.
3. Voluntary withdrawal from criminal conduct.
One possible textual anchor for the argument that drug reha-
bilitation was considered in § 3E1.1 is the language in the applica-
tion notes to § 3E1.1 to the effect that "voluntary termination or
withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations" is a factor rele-
vant to determining whether the defendant has accepted responsi-
"I Id at 115-16.
46 Id at 116.
47 See note 18 and accompanying text.
48 See note 17 and accompanying text.
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bility.49 Because drug use is criminal conduct, the defendant's vol-
untary termination of drug use (i.e., the defendant's rehabilitation)
is a factor in assessing whether the defendant has accepted respon-
sibility. Therefore, the argument goes, drug rehabilitation has been
considered in § 3E1.1 and is accordingly not an available grounds
for departure.50
A closer look at this argument, however, reveals several com-
pelling counterarguments. First, this argument creates an arbitrary
distinction between rehabilitations from drug abuse (which is gen-
erally criminal conduct) and alcohol abuse (which is generally not
criminal conduct). There is no reason to think that the Commis-
sion sought to require defendants addicted to drugs to do more
than defendants addicted to alcohol to gain the acceptance of re-
sponsibility reduction. In fact, the distinction is belied by the
equivalent treatment of these two afflictions in other sections of
the Guidelines. 51 Second, the connection between this application
note and the defendant's drug rehabilitation is so happenstance
that it should not qualify as adequate consideration. A finding of
adequate consideration should not turn on the fortuity that a gen-
eral provision of the Guidelines can be said to encompass the situ-
ation at issue. Rather, it must be clear that the Commission actu-
ally considered the circumstance in question. Such consideration is
not apparent in the phrase "voluntary termination or withdrawal
from criminal conduct."
B. Physical Condition Including Drug Dependence and Alcohol
Abuse
The second argument which courts have relied upon in deny-
ing departure rests on § 5H1.4, a policy statement 52 that provides
in relevant part:
4 Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (application note 1(a)) (cited in note 5).
50 There is some general support for this approach in the case law. This application
note has been relied upon by appellate courts upholding sentencing courts' refusal to grant a
§ 3E1.1 reduction to defendants convicted of drug-related offenses that have used narcotics
after their arrest. See United States v Scroggins, 880 F2d 1204, 1215-16 (11th Cir 1989)
(considering defendant's continued use of cocaine); United States v Weidner, 703 F Supp
1350, 1354 (N D Ind 1988) (considering defendant's failure of a urine test). See also United
States v Watkins, 911 F2d 983, 985 ("We note that this factor is phrased in general terms
and does not specify that the defendant need only refrain from criminal conduct associated
with the offense of conviction in order to qualify for the reduction.").
51 See for example, Guidelines Manual § 5H1.4 (cited in note 5) ("Drug dependence or
alcohol abuse is not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines.").
2 Section 5H1.4 is a "policy statement," not a "guideline." While the courts have gen-
erally treated the two as equivalent, some commentators have argued that this difference
1992]
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Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a reason for im-
posing a sentence below the guidelines. Substance abuse is
highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime.
Due to this increased risk, it is highly recommended that a
defendant who is incarcerated also be sentenced to supervised
release with a requirement that the defendant participate in
an appropriate substance abuse program.5 3
The courts that have found that the Commission considered
drug rehabilitation in this provision have supported their position
with only cursory assertions. Pharr is typical: "We read policy
statement 5H1.4 to mean that dependence upon drugs, or separa-
tion from such a dependency, is not a proper basis for a downward
departure from the guidelines. '54 Judge Silberman's dissent in
Harrington II may well have expressed this argument the most co-
gently. The dissent argued that the Commission's explicit rejection
of drug dependence asgrounds for a downward departure implic-
itly included a rejection of drug rehabilitation: "After all, rehabili-
tation is not relevant unless one is dependent. '55
These arguments turn on the superficial similarity between
drug dependence and rehabilitation from drug dependence.5 6 Such
reasoning, however, conflicts with the rationale behind this policy
statement. The policy statement reflects a shift from a retributive
concept of punishment (where the defendant is less culpable when
her clouded mental state prevented her from being fully aware of
her criminal actions and their consequences) to a deterrent ration-
ale for punishment (where the defendant's addiction renders her
more likely to commit further crimes and thus heightens the need
for punishment). Accordingly, it would be improper to adjust the
defendant's sentence downward from the guideline range because
of a defendant's impaired awareness at the time of a crime. How-
ever, § 5H1.4's concern with "propensity to commit [future]
crime," makes it incongruous to prohibit departure when a defend-
bears on the deference courts should accord the two. See, for example, Marc Miller and
Daniel J. Freed, Offender Characteristics and Victim Vulnerability: The Difference Be-
tween Policy Statements and Guidelines, 3 Fed Sent Rptr 3 (1990). But see Williams v
United States, 112 S Ct 1112, 1119-20 (1992).
53 Guidelines Manual § 5H1.4 (cited in note 5).
" Pharr, 916 F2d at 133. See also United States v Martin, 938 F2d 162, 163-64 (9th Cir
1991).
Harrington II, 947 F2d at 970 (Silberman dissenting).
Wa hile the dissent in Harrington 11 was more precise than Martin and Pharr in call-
ing rehabilitation and dependence "companion concepts" rather than equivalents, all three
arguments are flawed to the extent they conflate these two different ideas.
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ant has reduced such propensity by breaking her addiction to
drugs. If anything, the provision's emphasis on deterrence seems to
lend credence to a departure based on the defendant's rehabilita-
tion. If a court concludes that drug addiction motivated the de-
fendant to commit a crime, it should follow that the rehabilitated
defendant poses not only less of a threat of recidivism than an ad-
dicted criminal, but even less of a threat than a non-addict defend-
ant (of whom the court cannot be sure that the motivation to com-
mit the crime has dissipated).57
Several courts have also argued that the Commission ade-
quately considered drug rehabilitation in § 5H1.4's recommenda-
tion that addicted offenders be required to undergo drug treatment
as a condition of their supervised release after incarceration.5 8 This
argument, however, is also misleading. As the full text of § 5H1.4
reveals, the recommendation that the court require an offender to
participate in such a program stems from the "increased risk" of
recidivism posed by an addict. The explicitly deterrent rationale of
the requirement suggests that it is inapplicable to a rehabilitated
offender. Furthermore, the mere mention of "drug rehabilitation"
as a condition of an addicted offender's probation does not lead to
the conclusion that the Commission adequately considered the al-
together different circumstance of the defendant who rehabilitates
himself prior to going to prison. Section 5H1.4's recommendation
simply does not apply to, and hence cannot constitute considera-
tion of, a rehabilitated defendant.5 9
C. Congress's Purported Rejection of Rehabilitation as a Goal of
Sentencing
Courts denying the availability of departure have also claimed
that a departure for drug rehabilitation is inconsistent with their
" The district court in United States v Harrington, 741 F Supp 968 (D DC 1990)
("Harrington I"), vacated, 947 F2d 956 (DC Cir 1991) ("Harrington H"), recognized this
point. Citing § 5H1.4's statement that "[s]ubstance abuse is highly correlated to an in-
creased propensity to commit crime," the court noted: "There is an obvious negative preg-
nant in this statement by the Commission: successful treatment for drug abuse could lead to
a reduced propensity to commit crime and thereby reduce the need for [] longer periods of
incarceration.... ." Id at 975-76. See also United States v Williams, 948 F2d 706, 710 (11th
Cir 1991) ("Section 5H1.4 does not prohibit downward departures based on recoveries; it
merely prohibits downward departures on the basis of a defendant's theoretical diminished
capacity because of his drug dependence.").
U See Martin, 938 F2d at 164; Harrington II, 947 F2d at 970 (Silberman dissenting).
" See also Williams, 948 F2d at 710 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit in Martin "read
too much into the Commission's recommendation for supervised release conditioned on drug
treatment").
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perception of the role of rehabilitation in the new sentencing re-
gime.6 0 These courts first note (correctly) that the Act marked a
shift away from a "medical" sentencing model in which sentences
are designed to reflect the amount of time it will take the defend-
ant to be rehabilitated.6 1 They support this position by referring to
the language in the Act that the Guidelines should reflect the
"inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprison-
ment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant . ... 62
Courts have concluded from this that rehabilitation is an inappro-
priate consideration in the new sentencing system.6 3
This reasoning, however, is mistaken. Congress and the Com-
mission consciously chose to retain rehabilitation as a purpose of
sentencing.6 4 In one of the most important and controversial por-
tions of the statute, the Act specifically required that the sentenc-
ing court shall consider, among other things, "the need for the sen-
tence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
tional treatment in the most effective manner .... 65
The Act proceeds to explain the role of this last fac-
tor-rehabilitation-in sentencing:
The court, in determining whether to impose a term of im-
prisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed,
in determining the length of the term, shall consider the fac-
tors set forth [above] to the extent that they are applicable,
recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.6 6
Read together, these sections appear to require the judge to con-
sider the prospect of the defendant's rehabilitation in imposing a
0 See, for example, Sklar, 920 F2d at 115.
01 See text at note 6.
02 28 USC § 994(k) (1988).
63 See, for example, Sklar, 920 F2d at 115 ("It is crystal clear that Congress largely
rejected rehabilitation as a direct goal of criminal sentencing under the guidelines.").
11 See 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D) (1988); United States v Lara, 905 F2d 599, 604 (2d Cir
1990) ("[A]Ithough the role of rehabilitation in sentencing has been sharply restricted by
the Guidelines, rehabilitation has not been entirely eliminated from the sentencing pro-
cess."). See also Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 916 (cited in note 6) ("[A] careful reading
of the exact statutory language ultimately adopted, together with a review of the legislative
history, makes clear that commitment to a single explicit rationale ... would be in direct
contradiction to the intent of the enabling legislation."). Professor Nagel was a member of
the Commission that adopted the Guidelines.
05 18 USC § 3553(a). The sentencing court is also instructed to consider retribution,
general deterrence and incapacitation.
66 18 USC § 3582(a).
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sentence, while prohibiting a sentence of imprisonment solely to
provide needed services to the prisoner.
While the Act did "reject[] imprisonment as a means of pro-
moting rehabilitation, '1 7 there is a difference between imprison-
ment imposed in order to rehabilitate the defendant and the de-
fendant's rehabilitation as grounds for a reduction in the length of
a sentence." The distinction becomes more apparent when it is re-
alized that the warning about using imprisonment as a means of
promoting rehabilitation is narrowly tailored to prevent judges
from imposing a sentence of imprisonment just because the prison
offers a rehabilitative program that the judge feels may be of use
to the defendant. The Senate Report on the Act explicitly recog-
nized this point. It states that the provision was meant to "discour-
age the employment of a term of imprisonment on the sole ground
that a prison has a program that might be of benefit to the pris-
oner." 9 Members of the Commission have also recognized that this
provision does not abandon rehabilitative considerations, but that
"it intended to make clear that imprisonment should not be the
sentence of choice if the primary purpose for the sanction is reha-
bilitation of the offenders. ' 70 The Act, therefore, seems not only to
provide a place for rehabilitation in the sentencing regime, but af-
firmatively requires judges to consider the potential impact of a
sentence on the defendant's rehabilitation in determining the
length of the sentence.7 '
D. Fairness to Non-Addicts
Other courts have argued that to allow a departure for defend-
ants who have rehabilitated themselves would be unfair to defend-
ants who are not addicted to drugs and thus do not have a chance
6 Mistretta, 488 US at 367 (citing 28 USC § 994(k) (1988)) (emphasis added).
68 See Harrington I, 741 F Supp at 975. Throughout the sentencing reform process,
criminologists have emphasized that the purposes of incarceration and the reasons for pun-
ishing someone are distinct inquiries. See, for example, Norval Morris, The Future of Im-
prisonment 58-84 (Chicago, 1974).
6" S Rep No 98-225, in 1984 USCCAN at 3302 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added).
70 Nagel, 80 J Crim L & Criminol at 901 n 109 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
' S Rep No 98-225 in 1984 USCCAN at 3258 (cited in note 4) (The factors laid out in
18 USC § 3553(a) "appl[y] to both the appropriate type of sentence (e.g., fine, probation,
imprisonment, or a combination thereof) and to the severity of the sentence." (emphasis
added)). Note, however, that once imposed, a defendant's sentence may not be modified
unless the court finds "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18
USC § 3582(c)(1)(A). The statute goes on to provide that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant
alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." 28 USC § 994(t).
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to gain such a reduction.72 The courts have given this argument a
statutory basis by arguing that such a departure would violate
Congress's mandate that like defendants who have committed like
offenses be punished similarly.73
An exaggerated notion of the uniformity the Guidelines sought
to achieve seems to underlie these arguments. The Guidelines sim-
ply did not seek to prevent courts from drawing any distinctions
between offenders with the same criminal history who have com-
mitted the same offense. In fact, a number of the provisions of the
Act differentiate among similarly-situated offenders. 4 For in-
stance, the Guidelines' provision for a downward departure from
the specified sentencing range for "substantial assistance to au-
thorities" creates as many alparent anomalies as would allowing a
downward departure for drug rehabilitation. Under § 5K1.1, a de-
fendant can receive a sentence lower than that specified by the
Guidelines if she has provided assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. The
provision specifically mentions that the judge may consider "the
nature and extent of the defendant's assistance. ' 75 As several
courts have noted, § 5KL.1 provides a benefit to defendants who
are more heavily involved in criminal activities and thus have more
information to offer to the government.7 6 Despite the resultant
"unfairness" to defendants who are not heavily involved in crimi-
nal activities, § 5K1.1 is undoubtedly a legitimate basis for depar-
ture. Consequently, it seems that the analogous anomalies poten-
7 See Pharr, 916 F2d at 133; Martin, 938 F2d at 164.
See 18 USC § 3553(a)(6).
' The court in Rodriguez enumerated the pervasiveness of individual characteristics in
Congress's sentencing scheme:
Section 991(b)(1) specifies . . . that sentences provide "fairness" and "reflect to the
extent practicable advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process." Section 3552 provides for a "presentence investigation of a
defendant"; a court which desires more information "may order a study of the defend-
ant," as well as a psychological examination. Section 3553 provides that the sentence
should be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with [specified] pur-
poses" including "(A) . . . to provide just punishment ... [and] (C) to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant." This discretion unquestionably envisions
more severe sentences for defendants considered more likely to commit further crimes
and less severe sentences for those unlikely to commit crimes. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(C).
724 F Supp at 1120.
76 Guidelines Manual § 5Kl.1(a)(3) (cited in note 5). The commentary stresses that
"[s]ubstantial weight should be given to the government's evaluation of the extent of the
defendant's assistance .... ." Id (application note 3).
7' See, for example, Floyd, 738 F Supp at 1259.
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tially created by allowing departure for drug rehabilitation are not
inconsistent with the spirit of the Guidelines.
E. The Scope of the Departure Privilege
Parsing the Guidelines to reach the conclusion that the Com-
mission has not considered post-offense drug rehabilitative efforts
ignores the degree to which appellate courts' decisions whether to
recognize departures may be influenced by broader considerations
of the frequency of departure in the Guidelines system. Some of
the courts that have denied departures seem to have been moti-
vated by the impression that departures violate the spirit of the
Guidelines and ruin any uniformity the system hoped to achieve.7
Others may have perceived departures based on the defendant's
post-offense rehabilitation as merely a tacit way of reducing the
relatively stiffer sentences that the Guidelines impose on first-time
offenders who were addicted at the time they committed their of-
fense.78 Some district court judges have fundamental disagree-
ments with the Guidelines that undoubtedly inform their sentenc-
ing decisions, making them less hesitant to depart from the
Guidelines' sentencing ranges.79 Conversely, some appeals court
judges seem to view a district court's choice to depart downward
from the guideline range as infidelity to-if not outright subver-
sion of-the new system.80 Adding to the confusion, the Circuits
have not been consistent in their approach to discretion in depart-
ing from the Guidelines."
17 See, for example, Van Dyke, 895 F2d at 987 ("The primary Congressional objective
embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act [] was to produce consistency and uniformity in
sentencing, a worthy goal which requires us to put some of the practices of the past aside.").
11 Such an impression may not be mere speculation either. See Harrington II, 947 F2d
at 967 (Edwards concurring) ("This case is an example of how the Guidelines work at their
worst. Although Harrington's crime was admittedly serious, he was a first offender and was
addicted to narcotics.").
7 See Harrington II, 947 F2d at 963-70 (Edwards concurring) (includes an appendix
compiling judicial criticism of the Guidelines); United States v Rodriguez, 724 F Supp 1118
(S D NY 1989).
80 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity (forthcoming) ("The superficial analysis and strained logic of
so many appellate decisions suggests that part of what is at work is a general view that
departures are a threat to the guidelines system, so that the appellate judges must maintain
pressure to confine discretion and keep departures to a minimum.").
" Compare United States v Lara, 905 F2d 599, 604 (2d Cir 1990); United States v
Roberson, 872 F2d 597, 601, 602 n 4 (5th Cir 1989); United States v Rodriguez, 882 F2d
1059, 1068 (6th Cir 1989); United States v Jordan, 890 F2d 968, 973 (7th Cir 1989); with
United States v Williams, 891 F2d 962, 964 (1st Cir 1989).
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This confusion is understandable. The very notion of a "guide-
line" presupposes a balancing between rigidity and flexibility. The
Act reflects this delicate balance.2 Congress instructed the Com-
mission to establish practices that "avoid[] unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparities among defendants with similar records ...while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized .sentences
when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors .... 81
While the Commission actually created a fairly broad depar-
ture privilege in the Guidelines, it clearly favored a chary approach
to its use."4 The legislative history of the Act, however, emphasizes
the Guidelines' flexibility:
The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be im-
posed in a mechanistic fashion. It believes that the sentencing
judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant factors in a
case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an ap-
propriate case. The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to
provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropri-
ateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to elim-
inate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences.
Indeed, the use of sentencing guidelines will actually enhance
the individualization of sentences as compared to current
law.85
Flexibility is also critical when one considers that the Guide-
lines are evolutionary. The Commission plans to refer to the rea-
sons judges cite for departing from the Guidelines as a basis for
making future refinements to the Guidelines.8 6 Since the Commis-
sion essentially retains the power to sharply restrict, if not pre-
82 This tension also reflects the legislative compromise that gave birth to the Act. In the
course of the congressional wrangling over the implementation of the Guidelines, the House
secured an amendment to the language of the departure privilege that seems to have soft-
ened any stricture implicit in the original formulation against excessive departure. However,
Senate leaders, forced to agree to the amendment to avoid delay in the implementation of
the Guidelines, stressed that they did not understand the amendment to broaden the depar-
ture privilege. See Nagel, 80 J Crim and Criminol at 938-39 n 290 (cited in note 6).
83 28 USC § 991(b)(1)(B).
84 Guidelines Manual, ch 1 at 7 (cited in note 5) ("[Tlhe Commission believes that
despite the courts' legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very
often.").
88 S Rep No 98-225, in 1984 USCCAN at 3235-36 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added).
See also id at 3235 n 71 (anticipating that the rate of departures under the Guidelines will
be about 20%).
86 See id at 3263 (requiring statement of reasons when judge departs "assists the Sen-
tencing Commission in its continuous reexamination of its guidelines and policy state-
ments."). See also Breyer, 17 Hofstra L Rev at 18 (cited in note 22).
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clude, judicial consideration of any factor by mentioning that it
has been considered, there is a strong argument for erring on the
side of allowing a questionable factor to be considered in depart-
ing.87 Allowing departures based on drug rehabilitation affords
courts the necessary flexibility envisioned by the Act, and offers
the Commission the bounty of the courts' practical experience
when future revisions are contemplated.
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF CASES ALLOWING DEPARTURE
While only one appellate court has endorsed a departure
based on drug rehabilitation,8 a number of lower courts have
made such departures.8 9 With several notable exceptions,9 how-
ever, those courts have provided few reasons for doing so. Since
departure is allowed when a factor has not been adequately consid-
ered by the Commission, the task of a court seeking to depart is
largely a negative one. There is little room for affirmative findings
since a court choosing to so depart must find that no provision of
the Guidelines indicates that the Commission considered drug
rehabilitation.
A. The Propriety of Individualized Consideration
In United States v Rodriguez, the district court for the South-
ern District of New York attacked the perceived rigidities of the
87 See United States v Correa-Vargas, 880 F2d 35, 40 (2d Cir 1988) (allowing the dis-
trict court discretion to depart because the "dynamic relationship" between the Commission
and the courts ensures that the Commission can limit such discretion if it desires to);
United States v Smith, 909 F2d 1164, 1168-69 (8th Cir 1990), cert denied, 111 S Ct 691
(1991) ("There is a growing awareness of measured play in the joints of the Guidelines ....
By acknowledging and explaining the departures required to do justice, sentencing
courts-like the juries Justice Holmes envisioned working pure the law of negli-
gence-contribute to a better set of future guidelines.").
"' Maddalena, 893 F2d at 817 n 1 (remanding because the judge's remarks at sentenc-
ing suggested he was not aware he had the power to depart from the guideline range pursu-
ant to § 5K2.0 based on extensive rehabilitative efforts over the course of at least nine
years). It is not clear from the opinion whether the court was considering efforts the defend-
ant made after his conviction, or merely the defendant's efforts to stay away from drugs in
the years preceding his conviction. For an argument that the Maddalena court only consid-
ered the latter, see Harrington II, 947 F2d at 961. But see United States v Maddelena, 931
F2d 57 (6th Cir 1991) (Appeal after remand dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The district
court "recognized that it had discretion to depart downward, but chose not to depart" on
account of the defendant's "potential for drug rehabilitation.") (emphasis added).
" See note 19.
,o United States v Rodriguez,724 F Supp 1118 (S D NY 1989); Harrington I, 741 F
Supp 968 (D DC 1990), vacated, 947 F2d 956 (DC Cir 1991); United States v Davis, 763 F
Supp 645 (D DC 1991).
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Guidelines in the course of departing downward on the basis of the
defendant's drug rehabilitation."' After his arrest for selling $10
worth of crack, Rodriguez overcame his addiction, remained drug
free for two years, reunited with his wife and children, assumed
responsibilities for his family, obtained employment, and took clas-
ses to better his job opportunities.2 After noting that the "rehabil-
itation of a drug addict by his act of will is no mean accomplish-
ment,"93 the court concluded that it would be "senseless,
destructive and contrary to the objectives of the criminal law to
now impose a year's jail term on this defendant."94
In the course of deciding to depart downward, Judge Leval
launched a frontal assault on what he felt was a "widespread but
serious misconception that Congress ... intended to do away-with
consideration of the personal characteristics of the offender."9
Canvassing the statute, the court noted a number of places in
which the Act directs courts to consider the personal characteris-
tics of the defendant96 and concluded that "the Commission ex-
pressly acknowledged the need in the 'atypical' case for invocation
of the departure power to give appropriate effect to personal char-
acteristics. 9 7 After pointing out that courts have relied on this de-
parture privilege in instances analogous to drug rehabilitation and
noting that the Commission planned to base revisions to the
Guidelines on their observations of judges' departure practices, the
court concluded that a downward departure was both allowable
and warranted.98
B. Restating the Inquiry: "An Amenability to Drug Treatment"
as Grounds for Departure
In Harrington 1 99 and United States v Davis,00 Judge
Oberdorfer of the District Court for the District of Columbia pro-
vided an alternative rationale for departure. Rather than inquiring
9' 724 F Supp at 1119-20.
92 Id at 1119.
93 Id.
" Id. Although the statute under which the defendant was convicted did not mandate
imprisonment, one year was the minimum statutory sentence. Since the guideline range was
eight to fourteen months, if the court had chosen not to depart, the defendant would have
to have been sentenced to at least one year. Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id at 1121.
9 Id at 1122-23.
9 741 F Supp 968.
10' 763 F Supp 645.
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into the defendant's desire for rehabilitation or rehabilitative pro-
gress, Judge Oberdorfer focused on whether the defendant was
amenable to successful drug treatment. 1 '
Surveying the Guidelines and relying on an amicus memoran-
dum on the subject, Judge Oberdorfer in Harrington I first found
that the Commission never considered the circumstance of a de-
fendant who was determined to be a particularly good candidate
for rehabilitation. 02 He then determined that the defendant was
amenable to successful drug rehabilitation, citing evidence that
drug rehabilitative efforts are effective and noting that the defend-
ant had exhibited characteristics highly correlated to successful
drug rehabilitation.' In particular, the court relied upon the sen-
tencing report, an examination of the defendant by a court-ap-
pointed psychiatrist and his associate, letters from three officials
involved with the defendant's drug treatment program, written
and oral reports by the defendant's probation officer, and the
court's own observation of the defendant in his several appear-
ances. 0 4 Specifically, Judge Oberdorfer found that the defendant
exhibited maturity and devotion to his intensive drug treatment
program.10
In Davis, Judge Oberdorfer further developed this analysis.
He distinguished cases like Van Dyke that concluded that the
Commission incorporated the defendant's drug rehabilitation into
the acceptance of responsibility adjustment on the grounds that
such decisions found that the Guidelines considered "evidence of a
desire for rehabilitation," rather than "concrete evidence of a like-
lihood of successful treatment of the drug addiction .... "06 Thus,
the court concluded that departure based upon evidence of a "sub-
stantial likelihood of successful drug treatment" was legitimate. 07
This distinction-an objective, scientific assessment of the
likelihood of rehabilitation versus evidence of a mere desire for re-
habilitation-is troublesome. There seems to be little practical dif-
ference between a desire for rehabilitation and the likelihood of
successful rehabilitation. In Harrington I, the court primarily re-
lied on the court-appointed psychiatrist's report and the defend-
101 Id at 652; Harrington I, 741 F Supp at 976.
102 Harrington I, 741 F Supp at 974-76.
103 Id at 977.
I" Id at 976-77.
105 Id at 977.
"I Davis, 763 F Supp at 652 (emphasis on "desire" added).
107 Id.
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ant's dedication to his treatment program. 108 The psychiatrists'
conclusions in turn appeared to be based on the defendant's char-
acteristics (maturity, sincerity, etc.) and the attitude he displayed
in their meeting. In Davis the evidence mustered to illustrate that
the defendant had a likelihood of successful drug rehabilitation
largely consisted of the defendant's desire to rehabilitate herself as
manifested by her participation in drug treatment at a halfway
house.10 9 If the defendant's desire to undergo drug rehabilitation is
a part of the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for a crime, it
is hard to see how the defendant's likelihood of rehabilitation
(which is essentially a desire to rehabilitate herself coupled with a
few affirmative acts) is not also an acceptance of responsibility.
Judge Oberdorfer's solution is also potentially expensive and
time-consuming. Presumably, every defendant who seeks depar-
ture based on her likelihood of rehabilitation would request, and
be entitled to, a full battery of exams and tests, in the hopes that
they would demonstrate a likelihood of successful rehabilitation.
The court in Harrington II developed this point: "Reliance on 'sci-
entific' predictions . . . could potentially transform sentencing
under the guidelines into a battle of the experts .... ,11
If all defendants are not entitled to such an examination,
other problems arise. The expense of waging a battle of the experts
might subvert the Guidelines' purpose: another similarly-situated
defendant might not have the financial resources or judicial atten-
tion to be given the psychiatric examination and to procure credi-
ble expert witnesses."1 In short, this approach might lead to the
very sentencing disparities that Congress sought to avoid in au-
thorizing the Guidelines.1 2
These criticisms, however, are specific to the district court's
approach in Harrington I and Davis. While they do express signifi-
cant concerns about the ramifications of the solution proposed in
108 Harrington I, 741 F Supp at 977.
109 See Davis, 763 F Supp at 653. The court also relied on the fact that the defendant
had a strong family and a good counselor to support her efforts at rehabilitation. However,
the Guidelines make clear that "family ties and responsibilities and community ties" are
ordinarily not relevant in sentencing. See Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 (cited in note 5).
0 Harrington II, 947 F2d at 960. For a caustic critique of such reasoning, see
Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process (cited in note 80) ("One would have
thought that if psychiatric issues are relevant to just sentencing, and if indigents lack access
to necessary expertise, then an appointed expert should be provided. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has already made clear that the Constitution requires no less.") (citing Ake v
Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985)).




Harrington I and Davis, they do not constitute an argument that
the Commission adequately considered post offense rehabilitation
in the Guidelines.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This section proposes a resolution of the tension between the
statutory arguments that led to the conclusion that post-offense
rehabilitation has not been considered in the Guidelines, and the
concern that departures for such rehabilitation will expend valua-
ble judicial and correctional resources and lead to arbitrary dispar-
ities. A test that focuses on concrete steps the defendant has taken
toward drug rehabilitation reconciles this tension.
Determining whether a departure from the Guidelines based
on the defendant's drug rehabilitation is legitimate requires an un-
derstanding of what types of departures are available under the
Guidelines. A close examination of the Guidelines reveals that
there are several ways in which a court may depart from the sen-
tencing range.'13 In the context of the defendant's efforts at drug
rehabilitation, two types of departure recognized in § 5K2.0 are
relevant: quantitative and qualitative departures. 114 A sentencing
court may make a quantitative departure when the Commission
has considered a circumstance, but the circumstance exists in the
case at hand to a degree not considered by the Commission. A
qualitative departure is warranted when a defendant's circum-
stance is of a kind not considered by the Commission. This Section
focuses on these two potential avenues of departure, and concludes
that a departure based on the defendant's drug rehabilitation can
take the form of a qualitative departure. Such a departure should
11S There are other types of departures that are not relevant here. See generally Al-
schuler, 117 FRD at 459 (cited in note 22). See Guidelines Manual § 5Kl.1 (cited in note 5)
(court may depart from the guideline range upon the government's motion when the de-
fendant has provided "substantial assistance" to the authorities in the investigation or pros-
ecution of another person); id at § 4A1.3 (court may depart if the defendant's "criminal
history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal
conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes .... "); id at §§
5K2.1-5K2.15 (the Commission explicitly stated that it did not "take into account fully"
certain circumstances, thus inviting departure when they are present). Some offenses also
contain provisions for departure unique to them. See, for example, id at § 2Gl.1 (recom-
mending downward departure when offense did not involve physical force or coercion).
114 The distinction is clear in id at § 5K2.0 (departure available when there exists "a
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission") (emphasis added). The terms "qualitative" and "quantitative" are
borrowed from Sklar, 920 F2d at 115.
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be based on specific evidence of a defendant's affirmative efforts at
drug rehabilitation.
A. Quantitative Departure
Even if the sentencing court concludes that the Commission
did consider the prospect of the defendant's post-offense drug re-
habilitation, a quantitative departure is still possible if the court
feels that the defendant's conduct is sufficiently atypical to suggest
that the Commission did not consider the conduct in such unusual
form. In the context of drug rehabilitation, a quantitative depar-
ture requires a finding that the defendant has rehabilitated herself,
made rehabilitative efforts, or has a potential for rehabilitation to
a degree not recognized in the Commission's consideration of drug
rehabilitation. Sklar, Harrington II, and Williams each allowed for
the possibility of such a departure.'15
However, this approach seems strained and may prove un-
workable in practice. First, it is somewhat meaningless to speak of
an "unusual degree" of drug rehabilitation. A genuine and com-
plete rehabilitation prior to sentencing is certainly always an un-
usual situation. Allowing a departure when the defendant's reha-
bilitative efforts are truly unusual or extraordinary raises serious
questions about what would make a rehabilitative effort unusual:
its length? its intensity? its apparent success? the relative diffi-
culty of achieving that success?
Any inquiry into whether a particular defendant's prospect of
rehabilitation is sufficiently extraordinary to qualify for departure
runs into the same concern expressed in Harrington II; sentencing
under the Guidelines could turn into a battle of the experts." 6 Nor
is this concern limited to an inquiry into a defendant's likelihood
of rehabilitation. The very standard that the court in Harrington
II proposed-whether the rehabilitation itself is extraordi-
nary-seems to inevitably lead to the "battle of experts" the ma-
jority feared.1 7 Asking which defendants have made extraordinary
rehabilitations may only shift the battleground from the likelihood
of the defendant's rehabilitation to the extraordinary nature of the
rehabilitation. In short, allowing a quantitative departure based on
the defendant's drug rehabilitation is not a workable solution.
'1' Sklar, 920 F2d at 116; Harrington II, 947 F2d at 962; Williams, 948 F2d at 710.
"6 See text accompanying notes 110-12.




Qualitative departures, those warranted by the fact that the
Commission has not considered the kind of circumstance in ques-
tion, have rightly received the most attention in the case law. As
discussed earlier,1 " no provision in the Guidelines constitutes a
consideration of the defendant's drug rehabilitative efforts. There-
fore, a qualitative departure based on the defendant's drug reha-
bilitation is legitimate. Such departures should conform to three
conditions.
First, the grounds upon which a court may rely in making such
a departure must be sufficiently circumscribed so as not to permit
the court to tacitly reduce the sentences of all drug-addicted de-
fendants. Addicted offenders who are out on bail may be entered
into rehabilitative programs prior to their sentencing, 1 9 and ad-
dicted defendants in custody can gain access to rehabilitative pro-
grams when possible.' 20 Allowing a downward departure every time
an offender enters one of these programs could become a de facto
reduction for drug-dependent defendants-a practical, if not out-
right, violation of § 5H1.4's proscription that drug dependency not
be a reason for a downward departure. Second, if such departures
were routinely granted, the frequency of departure would threaten
to undermine the Guidelines' goal of uniformity. The grounds
upon which a court relies in making a qualitative departure must
be atypical.' 2 ' Finally, concerns about the expense of expert testi-
mony and its potential to create the arbitrary disparities the
Guidelines were designed to eliminate weigh heavily against any
solution that requires such testimony. Limiting downward depar-
ture to those cases in which the defendant has exhibited genuine
affirmative efforts at rehabilitation satisfies these concerns.
1,8 See Section II.
1,9 See Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing 332-33 (Lawyers Co-op, 1978)
120 See Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation 197 (Oxford,
1990).
121 Courts have sometimes referred to the Guidelines' "heartland" concept as a short-
hand for the need to find atypicality. See, for example, Sklar, 920 F2d at 114-17. The Com-
mission stated that it intended "the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out
a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.
When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a guideline linguistically applies but
where conduct differs significantly from the norm, the court may consider whether a depar-
ture is warranted." Guidelines Manual, ch 1 at 6 (cited in note 5). Other bases of the need
for atypicality can be found in § 5K2.0's provision that the circumstances relied upon
"should result" in a lower sentence, and the provision in 18 USC § 3742(k)(3) that a depar-
ture can be reviewed for its reasonableness.
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Requiring the defendant to have undertaken genuine affirma-
tive efforts at drug rehabilitation mitigates the first two concerns
by limiting the number of defendants who will be eligible for the
departure.122 Not every drug addicted defendant will have made
genuine affirmative efforts at rehabilitation; this standard allows
the court to look for meaningful atypicality in the defendant's
post-offense efforts. Requiring meaningful atypicality alleviates
any concern over eviscerating the Guidelines' goal of increased uni-
formity. The third concern is satisfied as well. Unlike determining
the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, or the atypicality of
such rehabilitation, affirmative efforts at rehabilitation would be
fairly easy to identify and assess. Because such assessments are a
matter within the ken of the trial court, extensive expert testimony
would not be needed.
A potential shortcoming of this solution lies in its indetermi-
nacy (just what are "genuine affirmative efforts"?), and the possi-
bility that such indeterminacy will create the arbitrary sentencing
disparities of the sort foreseen by the court in Harrington II. Re-
sources dedicated to drug rehabilitation are limited; only a fraction
of the defendants incarcerated prior to their trial who seek access
to rehabilitation programs can be accommodated. Even for a non-
incarcerated defendant, participation in a drug treatment program
may be more a function of her lawyer's savvy or her financial
means than an accurate gauge of her sincerity and progress toward
rehabilitation.
This shortcoming is not fatal, however. First, there are several
reasons to believe that district court judges can accurately assess
whether a defendant has made genuine affirmative efforts at reha-
bilitation to merit a departure. Often, the sentencing judge will
have an opportunity to assess the defendant's character firsthand.
The judge is also privy to the probation officer's presentence re-
port, which records the officer's firsthand observations and com-
piles information from the drug counselors with whom the defend-
ant has worked. The impressive factual record compiled by Judge
Oberdorfer in Harrington 1 123 belies concerns over the district
court's capacity to make such a determination.
.22 In addition, this proposal shares an advantage with Harrington I and Davis. By
requiring more than the defendant's desire to reform herself, this proposal distances the
grounds relied upon from the ostensibly attitudinal focus of § 3E1.1. It also avoids focusing
on the defendant's family and community ties, a consideration the Guidelines foreclose. See
Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 (cited in note 5).
2I See text accompanying note 104.
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Also, departure should not be precluded merely because sen-
tencing judges may have difficulty in assessing mitigating or aggra-
vating factors. Such an argument would prove too much. Sentenc-
ing judges may not be able to perfectly sort those defendants who
have made genuine affirmative rehabilitative efforts from those
who merely participate in a rehabilitation program for appear-
ance's sake at the sentencing hearing. However, these judges also
cannot perfectly assess the defendant's acceptance of responsibil-
ity,124 or precisely determine whether the defendant's criminal his-
tory accurately reflects the likelihood she will commit further
crimes, 125 yet the Guidelines require such determinations. Any sen-
tencing system that seeks to vary punishment based on a defend-
ant's individual characteristics requires the judge to make specula-
tive assessments that no human can possibly make with unfailing
accuracy. If judges' lack of omniscience were a reason to forego
making any individual determinations, the practical alternative
would be to require the same sentence for all offenders who have
committed the same crime.
Moreover, the Guidelines implicitly vest their confidence in
courts to make a quite similar determination. When sentencing a
defendant convicted of a drug possession or trafficking offense, §
5F1.6 provides that the court may deny the defendant certain fed-
eral benefits.126 However, the application notes to § 5F1.6 contain
an exception:
[T]he period of benefit ineligibility shall be suspended "if the
individual (A) completes a supervised drug rehabilitation pro-
gram . . . ; (B) has otherwise been rehabilitated; or (C) has
made a good faith effort to gain admission to a supervised
drug rehabilitation program, but is unable to do so because of
inaccessibility or unavailability of such a program, or the in-
ability of the individual to pay for such a program.127
Importing the genuine affirmative effort standard into the de-
cision to depart downward provides a means of distinguishing
among defendants without creating disparities based on wealth or
the fortuity of gaining access to a prison rehabilitation program.
Again, this is not to imply that determining whether the defendant
has made a "good faith effort" or "genuine affirmative efforts" is a
"' Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (cited in note 5).
Id at § 4A1.3.
126 Id at § 5F1.6.
2I Id at § 5F1.6 (commentary) (quoting 21 USC § 853(a)(c)).
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foolproof process. It does demonstrate, however, that Congress be-
lieves that these are determinations which judges have made and
can continue to make.
Even if sentencing courts fail to exercise circumspection when
granting departures on the basis of drug rehabilitation, the depar-
ture is subject to appellate review of the "reasonableness" of the
departure. 12 8 Appellate court review of the reasonableness of the
departure will significantly alleviate the fear that such departures
will be tantamount to a tacit sentence reduction for all addicted
defendants or expand to the point that they jeopardize the Guide-
lines' goal of uniformity.
CONCLUSION
The Guidelines are a revolutionary system of sentencing.
Obeying them, in letter and in spirit, will certainly require courts,
as Judge Wilkins put it, to "put some of the practices of the past
aside.'1 29 Nonetheless, the simple fact that the present system
vests less discretion in the sentencing judge is not a talisman for
the resolution of all disputes over the scope of the departure privi-
lege. A close reading of the Guidelines reveals that they do not
preclude departure based on the defendant's genuine affirmative
efforts at rehabilitation. Nor is such a departure privilege inconso-
nant with the philosophy or practical workings of a guideline sys-
tem. A principled and restrained application of such a departure
privilege can only contribute to a coherent and just sentencing
system.t
"s 18 USC §§ 3742(e)(3), 3742(f)(2). Lower courts have taken varied approaches when
applying the reasonableness test. Compare United States v Lira-Barraza, 897 F2d 981, 983
(9th Cir 1990) (using the reasonableness standard to test the "extent or degree of depar-
ture"); with United States v Mejia-Orosco, 867 F2d 216, 219 (5th Cir 1989) (using the rea-
sonableness standard to test the reasons offered for departure). Dictum in the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement on the appellate review of departures seems to favor the
Lira-Barraza approach. See Williams v United States, 112 S Ct 1112, 1121 (1992). How-
ever, even if the explicit reasonableness test of 18 USC § 3742(e)(3) applies only to the
extent of departure, the "should result" language of § 5K2.0 and the "heartland" concept,
see note 121, justify appellate review of the reasonableness of a district court's decision to
depart.
119 Van Dyke, 895 F2d at 987.
t Editors Note: On May 11, 1992, after this issue went to press, the Sentencing Com-
mission submitted an amendment to § 3E1.1 of the guidelines, the acceptance of responsi-
bility adjustment, designed to foreclose departure by allowing consideration of post-offense
rehabilitative efforts in assessing the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. See 57 Fed
Reg 20148, 20156 (1992). If Congress does not act on this amendment prior to November 1,
1992, the amendment will take effect at that time. See id at 20148; 28 USC § 994(p) (1988).
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